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Abstract
We study optimal redistributive taxes when individuals diﬀer in two characteristics - earning
ability and leisure needs - assumed to be imperfectly correlated. Individuals have private
information about their abilities but needs are observable. With two diﬀerent levels of
observable needs the population can be separated into two groups and needs may be used as
a tag. We ﬁrst assume that the social planner considers individuals should be compensated
for their leisure needs and characterize the optimal redistributive policy, and the extent of
compensation for needs, with tagging. We also consider an alternative social objective in
which individuals are deemed responsible for their needs.
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One of the most common diﬀerences across households is that they have to divert some time
away from leisure or paid labor to a variety of duties. Examples of such duties are the need
to take care of children or of dependent parents, the hours devoted each day to commuting,
the extra time required for daily activities because of physical handicaps. These diﬀerences are
often neglected when designing tax policies and the purpose of this paper is to introduce them
explicitly. In particular we explore how information available on this type of needs may be used
for redistributive purposes. We study the extent and nature of compensation for leisure needs
when the observable needs provide information about the underlying distribution of ability and
may be used as a tag.
In the standard optimal redistributive taxation framework individuals are assumed to diﬀer in
a single characteristic: ability, which is private information but whose distribution is commonly
known. The private information nature of this characteristic imposes limits on the amount of
redistribution that can be achieved. In particular, the redistributive policy must be designed
so that individuals are given proper incentives to reveal their true types. The ﬁrst paper to
emphasize the implications of informational asymmetries on the design of optimal taxes was
Mirrlees (1971). He did so by assuming a continuum of abilities. Stiglitz (1982) considered a
discrete number of ability types instead and was able to provide further insights on the role of
the incentive compatibility constraints.
In reality, however, individuals may diﬀer in several characteristics. Some authors have
explored the implications for the government’s redistributive problem of using available infor-
mation about additional individual characteristics and shown that they may have a role to play
if they are correlated with ability. In a seminal paper in the area, Akerlof (1978) considered a
society in which high- and low-ability individuals could be grouped into two categories on the
basis of an exogenously observable characteristic. One category consisted of low-ability types
only and the other of both low- and high-ability types. He showed that, within his setting,
"tagging" (i.e. conditioning the tax on the observable individual characteristic) increases social
welfare but for particular social objectives might violate the principle of horizontal equity.
2Over time Akerlof’s tagging idea has gained considerable attention and presently there is
large interest in tagging and optimal income taxation. Recent contributions include Blomquist
and Micheletto (2008) - on age-dependent taxation1 - Cremer et al. (2009) - which provides
general analytical results as well as an application to gender-based taxation-, Alesina et al. (2011)
- on gender-based taxation - and Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010) - on height-based taxation. Until
recently the literature had produced very few analytical results on the implications of tagging on
the properties of optimal non-linear income tax schedules. Immonen et al. (1998) had previously
relied on simulations to explore the pattern of optimal marginal income tax rates in an economy
with a continuum of abilities and two tagged groups. In a similar setting Cremer et al. (2009)
were recently able to provide analytical results by assuming quasilinear preferences, a Rawlsian
social welfare function, and a constant and identical elasticity of labor supply within and across
the tagged groups.
The papers cited above focus on the case where the tag does not carry in itself any norma-
tive signiﬁcance but is used to separate the population into identiﬁable groups (denominated
henceforth "pure tagging"). Another strand of the literature deals with the case where the tag
has welfare signiﬁcance. Boadway and Pestieau (2006) study the eﬀects of tagging on redis-
tributive taxation both when the observable characteristic does not have and does have welfare
signiﬁcance. In particular, they assume that households vary by consumption needs, which are
reﬂected in diﬀerences in consumption requirements to achieve a given level of utility. They
compare the solutions obtained with pure tagging and tagging with consumption needs. They
also analyze the extent of compensation for needs when tagging is not feasible due, for instance,
to political constraints or ethical concerns with the violation of horizontal equity. In order to be
able to provide qualitative results they assume quasilinear preferences and social welfare func-
tions that exhibit constant absolute aversion to inequality. With pure tagging they show that,
under reasonable circumstances, the tax system is more redistributive in the tagged group with
the higher proportion of high-ability persons and that inter-group redistribution always goes
from the group with higher proportion of high-ability types to that with a lower proportion.
1Optimal age-dependent taxation had been previously studied by Lozachmeur (2006) in a life-cycle framework
with representative agent, and hence abstracting from any (intracohort) redistributive aspect of the tax system.
3When individuals diﬀer in consumption needs and these can be used as a tag, full compensation
for needs is optimal if a separate tax schedule applies to the two groups. The compensation
for needs is indeed a component of the optimal inter-group lump-sum redistribution scheme
and, within each group, the optimal tax schedule depends on the distribution of ability types
in the group. When observable consumption needs cannot be used as a tag and individuals
face a common tax schedule, there is generally imperfect compensation for needs: both under-
and over-compensation can result depending on the correlation of needs with ability. This con-
trasts with Rowe and Woolley (1999) who had previously suggested giving universal credit for
expenditures on consumption needs as part of an optimal non-linear income tax system.
In a related paper, Boadway and Pestieau (2003) incorporate leisure needs alongside con-
sumption needs. They discuss the implications for the optimal tax problem of the diﬀerent
types of needs being observable or not. They provide, but do not explore in detail, a few results
on tagging. With observable leisure needs, the maximin optimum would be characterized by a
standard non-linear income tax schedule with the usual characteristics (i.e. non-distortion at
the top and distortion at the bottom) within each group, and a transfer from the low-needs to
the high-needs group, with the correlation between ability and needs playing a crucial role. In
this paper we analyze tagging with leisure needs in further detail.
We model leisure needs in the same manner as Boadway and Pestieau (2003). The Stone-
Geary representation has been common in the literature on tagging and redistributive taxation,
especially for consumption needs, and we follow a similar approach. An important consequence
of the particular additive speciﬁcation adopted, which plays a crucial role in our analysis, is that
the compensation for leisure needs is skill-dependent. Several examples of the type of handicap
we wish to capture were given above; most of them have in common that the opportunity cost
of the time devoted to those needs diﬀers across ability groups. For instance, one hour of time
wasted in traﬃc by a skilled individual is generally considered costlier than the same hour wasted
by an unskilled individual.
Most of the analysis in this paper relies on the assumption that, while ability is private
information, leisure needs are publicly observable and may be used as a tag. We ﬁrst assume
4that the social planner considers that leisure needs deserve compensation and characterize the
optimal redistributive policy, and the extent of compensation for needs, with tagging. It is worth
noticing that, even if leisure needs are observable, the amount required to fully compensate for
needs diﬀers across ability types, and depends on the unobservable ability of individuals. This
is in contrast with the linear consumption needs case studied by Boadway and Pestieau (2006),
where the amount of compensation for needs is independent of the ability type. We obtain
imperfect compensation for needs in most cases. We also explore the case in which the social
planner may hold individuals responsible for their leisure needs. This might be particularly
relevant if there is an element of choice underlying some existing needs (for instance, if the
individual lives further from work because she enjoys the countryside). We show that, contrary
to the linear consumption needs case, it is not possible to make all needy individuals responsible
for their needs.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe the model
with two levels of ability and two levels of leisure needs, and provide the laissez-faire allocation.
In section 3 we characterize the ﬁrst-best solution, when both ability and leisure needs are
assumed to be observable. We characterize the second-best optimum, with unobservable ability
but observable leisure needs, in section 4. We do so for a relatively general social welfare
function. In order to shed more light on the results we explore several simpler speciﬁcations.
We concentrate ﬁrst on three-types societies, like Akerlof (1978), but take into account all the
possible combinations. We also provide the maximin results. It is worth noticing that we consider
a quasilinear utility speciﬁcation, similar to the one used by Boadway and Pestieau (2006), but
with the key diﬀerence that needs appear in the non-linear disutility of labor term rather than
the linear consumption term. In the absence of needs, however, the utility speciﬁcation would
be the same and their analysis of pure tagging does then carry over provided we impose similar
restrictions on the social utility. In section 5, we explore the consequences of adopting an
alternative social objective in which the planner attempts to make the individuals responsible
for their needs. We brieﬂy discuss in section 6 the implications of being unable to observe leisure
needs. A ﬁnal section concludes.
52 The model
We assume that individuals diﬀer in ability and leisure needs. We consider two types of ability
wi, with w2 > w1, where wi corresponds to the wage rate of a type-i individual, and two levels
of leisure needs, represented by ￿j, with ￿1 > ￿2. There are hence four types of individuals ij.
We assume that individual preferences can be represented by a quasilinear utility of the form:2




i,j = 1,2 (1)
where cij and ￿ij represent the consumption and the labor supply of individual ij, and the
disutility of labor function v(.) is assumed to be continuous, diﬀerentiable, strictly increasing
and strictly convex function (i.e. v￿ > 0 and v￿￿ > 0). In what follows we normalize the leisure
need of the low-need individuals ￿2 to 0 and denote the leisure need of the high-need individual
by ￿. Accordingly, we refer to needy and non-needy individuals. The proportion of individuals







As pointed out by Boadway and Pestieau (2003), the assumption that individual utilities are
identical net of needs implies that utility levels are comparable among households. This avoids
the conceptual problem of how to deﬁne the social planner’s objective function when individual
preferences are diﬀerent and utilities are non-comparable (see Boadway et al. (2002) for an
analysis of optimal redistribution with heterogeneous preferences). We represent in Figure 1
sets of individual indiﬀerence curves that yield the same utility level. We do so in Figure 1(a)
for two individuals with the same ability wi and diﬀerent needs in the (￿,c)-space. The two
2The Stone-Geary speciﬁcation is chosen on purpose. It implies that the opportunity cost of needs is increasing
in productivity. Other speciﬁcations could have been adopted. One possibility could be to incorporate a constant
need parameter δ > 1 with the disutility term becoming v(δ￿j), which amounts to a proportional reduction in




, implying the same opportunity cost for all. With our
additive speciﬁcation we implicitly assume that the productivity of individuals at meeting these needs is constant
and then independent of their productivity wi. Recent empirical research on parental time use suggests that
highly-educated parents view time spent with one’s children as an investment, as opposed to simple supervision
or traditional care, and tend to spend more time with their children despite the higher opportunity cost of their
time (see Guryan et al. (2008)). If that is the case an alternative model might be more appropriate for that
particular use of child care time, and the speciﬁcation that we adopt would be appropriate for the portion of the
















Figure 1: Sets of indiﬀerence curves yielding the same level of utility
indiﬀerence curves are horizontally parallel and the horizontal distance is given by the amount
of leisure need ￿. The indiﬀerence curves of individuals with diﬀerent ability and identical needs
have the same shape in this space. However, this is no longer the case in the (y,c)-space where
y = w￿. In Figure 1(b) we represent a set of indiﬀerence curves for the four types that yields the
same utility level to all. For each needs type, the indiﬀerence curve of a low-ability individual is
steeper than the indiﬀerence curve of a high-ability individual (that is, the usual single crossing
property applies within each needs group). The indiﬀerence curves of individuals with the same
ability but diﬀerent needs are horizontally parallel, and the horizontal distance is given by the
value of the leisure needs, wi￿, which is diﬀerent for diﬀerent ability levels. The four individuals’




-space where, as in
Boadway and Pestieau (2003), ￿ ￿ij = ￿ij + ￿j denotes the eﬀective labor supply.
In a market economy, each individual chooses cij and ￿ij to maximize (1) subject to the
budget constraint cij = wi￿ij. Hence,
max
￿ij





The ﬁrst-order condition (hereafter FOC) is v￿ ￿
￿ij + ￿j
￿
= wi. Hence, ￿i2 = ￿i1+￿ (i.e. ￿i2 > ￿i1)
for all i, and ￿2j > ￿1j for all j. All individuals with the same ability provide the same eﬀective
labor supply. However, the amount of hours worked in the labor market, and appropriately
remunerated, is lower for needy individuals. Hence, needy individuals earn a lower income.
7Among those individuals with the same needs, we have the standard result that those with
higher ability work and earn more. High-ability non-needy individuals work and earn the most.
Low-ability needy individuals work and earn the least. It is not possible to disentangle a priori
the relationship between high-ability needy individuals and low-ability non-needy individuals
(i.e. y21 and y12). The precise relationship depends on the particular ability and need gaps, as
well as the speciﬁc functional form for the disutility of labor. In any case, within each ability
group, needy individuals earn less than non-needy ones. It seems in principle fair to compensate
for diﬀerences in leisure needs within ability groups, and for diﬀerences in ability overall.
3 The ﬁrst-best
As a benchmark we analyze the ﬁrst-best solution. The problem of the planner who fully observes














+ µ(wi￿ij − cij)
￿
,
where µ is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the budget constraint. Given the quasi-
linearity of individual utilities, we use a strictly concave social utility transformation G(·) to
reﬂect diﬀerent degrees of aversion towards inequality.
The FOCs yield v￿ ￿
￿ij + ￿j
￿
= wi and G￿
ij = µ ∀ij, where G￿
ij is the marginal social utility
of consumption accruing to individual ij. As before, ￿i2 = ￿i1 + ￿ (i.e. ￿i2 > ￿i1) for all i, and
￿2j > ￿1j for all j. Among individuals with the same needs, the most productive work and
consume more. Individuals with the same ability supply the same eﬀective amount of labor ￿ ￿,
with those with higher needs working less in the marketplace. However, in the ﬁrst-best all




is equal for all ij, with ci1 = ci2 for all i. How can this ﬁrst-best allocation be decentralized? In
addition to the traditional redistribution between ability groups there is redistribution within
each ability group from non-needy to needy individuals.
Boadway and Pestieau (2003) show that full compensation for linear consumption needs
would require a rather simple tax-transfer scheme. In order to fully compensate for needs in
consumption c, and achieve the same eﬀective consumption ￿ c = c − c for all the individuals
8with the same ability, a lump-sum transfer of (n12 + n22)c needs to be provided to each needy
individual and a lump-sum tax of (n11 + n21)c has to be raised from each non-needy individual,
regardless of their ability. In our case, since the valuation of the leisure needs diﬀers by ability
type, a transfer of equal magnitude to both ability types within the needy group would not lead
to full compensation.
If we call Ti1 the net transfer to individual i1 (where i stands for the two diﬀerent ability
types within the needy group) and T2 the net transfer from non-needy individuals regardless of
ability,3 we have that, in order to fully compensate for needs within ability groups:
T11 = w1￿ + T2,
T21 = w2￿ + T2.
The sum of net transfers should fulﬁll the budget constraint n11T11+n21T21+(n12 + n22)T2 = 0.
The equilibrium set of transfers is:
T2 = −(n11w1 + n21w2)￿ < 0,
T11 = [(n12 + n22)w1 − n21 (w2 − w1)]￿, and
T21 = [(n12 + n22)w2 + n11 (w2 − w1)]￿ > 0.
Both types of non-needy individuals pay a lump-sum tax. High-ability needy individuals receive
a lump-sum transfer but low-ability needy individuals may pay a lump-sum tax or receive a
lump-sum transfer. The two possibilities regarding the treatment of low-ability needy individuals
arise because the compensation for leisure needs depends on the ability level. Low-ability needy
individuals receive a transfer when (n12 + n22)w1 > n21 (w2 − w1), which is satisﬁed when the
proportion of high-ability needy individuals and/or the productivity gap are suﬃciently small.
The ﬁrst-best allocation is depicted in Figure 2, both in the (￿,c)-space and the (y,c)-space. In
this last space the set of indiﬀerence curves represented - 11, 12, 21 and 22 - yield the same
utility level.
3Note that a set of three diﬀerent net transfers {T11,T21,T2} is suﬃcient in this case because the valuation of
leisure needs for all non-needy individuals is the same (i.e. zero). In the more general case, with positive high and
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Figure 2: First-best allocation
4 Tagging with leisure needs
In a second-best framework with imperfect information we need to incorporate self-selection
constraints (hereafter SSCs) to ensure individuals reveal their true types. When needs are
observable but ability is not observable the FB allocation represented in Figure 2 is no longer
feasible. A type-21 individual would be better oﬀ with the treatment designed for a type-11.
We represent the utility level achieved by such a mimicker by indiﬀerence curve 21’ in Figure
3. Similarly a type-22 individual would be better oﬀ with the treatment designed for 12, at
indiﬀerence curve 22’. Note also that the horizontal distance between the indiﬀerence curves
of the high-ability individuals in the ﬁrst-best allocation is w2￿, while the horizontal distance
between two high-ability individuals attempting to mimic the low-ability individuals in their
respective groups is w1￿, which implies that in such an event a type-22 mimicker would be
better oﬀ than a type-21. When needs are observable, the relevant SSCs are the ones that relate
individuals of diﬀerent ability in each needs group (i.e. preventing 21 from mimicking 11 and 22
from mimicking 12).
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nij (yij − cij) ≥ 0






















where λj stand for the Lagrange multipliers associated with SSCs within each needs group j
(with j = 1,2).
The FOCs yield:
G￿
















The relationship between the utility level achieved by individuals of the same ability and diﬀerent
needs depends on the ratio of the value of the Lagrange multiplier (the strength of the SSC in
the group) to the proportion of individuals of that ability level in each group (the larger or

































The second-best levels of y22 and y21 coincide with the ﬁrst-best ones and both types of high-
ability individuals supply the same eﬀective amount of labor ￿ ￿.4 There is no eﬃciency gain in
distorting the labor supply choice of any of the high-ability individuals. This does not mean
that both types achieve the same utility because, as mentioned above, they might end up with
diﬀerent consumption. Both low-ability individuals are distorted at the margin and supply a
lower eﬀective labor than in the ﬁrst-best. However, the relationship between the amounts of
eﬀective labor supplied by the two low-ability individuals is ambiguous.
At this level of generality it is diﬃcult to give more precise results. We cannot obtain
explicit expressions for the Lagrange multipliers in terms of the parameters, particularly the
distribution of types. In order to shed more light we explore several simpler speciﬁcations. We
concentrate ﬁrst on three-types societies. With 3 types one of the needs groups is composed
by individuals of the same ability, which becomes then public information. This is similar to
the kind of society considered originally by Akerlof (1978). We also explore the consequences
of adopting a particular social objective - the maximin - when all 4 types of individuals are
present. This particular social objective has been commonly employed in the literature on
tagging. For instance, Cremer et al. (2009) assume that the social planner is Rawlsian and
Boadway and Pestieau (2006) restrict the analysis to social objectives characterized by constant
absolute aversion to inequality, among which the maximin outcome is amply discussed.
4.1 Three-types societies
There are four diﬀerent possible three-types societies: {11,12,22}, {11,12,21}, {11,21,22} and
{12,21,22}. We formally analyze the ﬁrst case and brieﬂy mention the results for the other three.
When only individuals of types 11, 12 and 22 are present in the population, all needy
individuals are low-ability, and this information can be taken into account in the design of the
optimal tax system. There is now only one relevant self-selection constraint, the one that links
high- and low-ability types in the non-needy group and from (2) we know that U22 > U11 > U12
4The second-best levels of y22 and y21 do not longer coincide with the ﬁrst-best ones, and the high-ability
individuals do not necessarily supply the same eﬀective amount of labor ￿ ￿, with a separable but not quasilinear
utility speciﬁcation.
12as long as λ2 > 0 (i.e. the relevant self-selection constraint is binding). A low-ability needy
individual is made better oﬀ compared to a low-ability non-needy individual because the social
planner can identify her as being low-ability by observing her leisure needs. This is consistent
with Akerlof (1978)’s ﬁndings.
We can also study the marginal tax rates and the extent of compensation for leisure needs.
Type-22 individuals face a zero marginal tax rate and type-12 individuals face a positive mar-
ginal tax rate. This is consistent with the more general results shown above. When all needy
individuals are low-ability, and we apply separate tax schedules to needy and non-needy, there
is no reason to impose a positive marginal tax rate on type-11 individuals. The eﬀective labor
supply of needy individuals is higher, but they are more than fully compensated for their leisure
needs with extra consumption:5












This situation is depicted in Figure 4. The lines 11, 12 and 22 represent the utility levels achieved
by these three types of individuals in the second-best allocation. The dashed lines 12’ and 22’
represent the indiﬀerence curves in situations where types 12 and 22 would obtain the same
utility level as type 11. Clearly type-12 individuals are worse oﬀ, and type-22 individuals better
oﬀ, than type-11 ones.
If all non-needy individuals are low-ability instead, there is no beneﬁt in distorting the
labor supply decision of type-12 individuals. The eﬀective labor supply of type-11 individuals
is low relative to type-12 (￿11 + ￿ < ￿12), but type-11 individuals also receive considerably less
consumption, and end up being worse than type-12 ones: U21 > U12 > U11.
In societies composed by two types, needy and non-needy, of high-ability individuals and
one type of low-ability individual, the relationship between the level of utility achieved by the
high-ability types depends on whether the low-ability type is needy or non-needy. We showed
in the general case that there is non-distortion at the margin on both high-ability types and
they provide the same eﬀective amount of labor. However, they are allocated diﬀerent amounts
of consumption depending on the group they belong to. If the low-ability type is needy, the
5In the separable case it is possible to show that c11 > c12 but any relationship between utility levels and the














Figure 4: Second-best allocation in the 11,12 and 22 society
non-needy individuals are identiﬁed as high-ability types and U21 > U22 > U11. If the low-ability
type is non-needy, the needy individuals are identiﬁed as high-ability types and U22 > U21 > U12.
4.2 Maximin
We now explore the consequences of adopting a maximin social objective. As mentioned above,
this objective has been commonly assumed in the literature on tagging. In our case, the maximin















nij (yij − cij) ≥ 0

































where γ stands for the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint that relates both
low-ability types. The public information on leisure needs implies that the two low-ability types
can be separated. There is then no incentive compatibility constraint linking the two low-ability
14types but instead a constraint that ensures that the utility of type-12 individuals does not fall
below the utility of type-11 ones. The FOCs associated with the consumption variables yield:
µ = 1, λ1 = n21, λ2 = n22 and γ = n12 + n22.
Therefore, all the constraints bind. It is worth noticing that U11 = U12 in the maximin outcome,
regardless of the distribution of abilities in the needy and non-needy groups. The relationship
between the marginal tax rates they face and the eﬀective amount of labor they supply depends,















































The low-ability individuals face positive marginal tax rates, which coincide if the eﬀective amount
of labor supplied is the same. Both high-ability individuals face face zero marginal tax rates
and supply the same eﬀective amount of labor, as shown for the general case. This does not
mean however that they achieve the same utility levels. It can be shown that the relationship
between the levels of utility achieved by the two high-ability types is linked to the relationship
between the eﬀective labor supplied by the low-ability types: ￿11 + ￿ ≤ ￿12 implies U22 > U21
whereas ￿11 + ￿ > ￿12 implies U21 > U22.
The expressions for the marginal tax rates faced by the low-ability individuals depend on the
ratio of high- to low-ability individuals in each needs group. In the particular case where those
ratios coincide it can be shown that ￿12 = ￿11 + α￿ with 1 < α < w2/w1. Hence, the eﬀective
amount supplied by the non-needy is larger, and U22 > U21. In the extreme distributional cases
where all high-ability individuals belong to the same group, it is easy to show that ￿11 +￿ > ￿12
when high-ability individuals are non-needy (i.e. n21 = 0), whereas ￿11 + ￿ < ￿12 when high-
ability individuals are needy (i.e. n22 = 0). In any case, the low-ability individual who is pushed
to work a relatively larger eﬀective amount of time (inclusive of her need) is compensated by
15a higher consumption that equates both low-ability utility levels. The high-ability individual
achieves a higher level of utility.6
5 Responsibility
We have assumed so far that needy individuals deserve compensation for their needs, even if
the absence of full information on abilities implies imperfect compensation for leisure needs in
most cases. Compensation for leisure needs may seem fair when the need stems from some
type of handicap that the individual is somehow forced to address before she can become an
active participant in the labor market. It is unclear, however, that the social planner would
want to compensate individuals for all possible types of leisure needs. For instance, in the case
of commuting time the planner may be reluctant to compensate someone who opts to leave far
away from work because she enjoys the countryside. In this section we consider the consequences
of attempting to hold the individuals responsible for their needs.7
We choose to capture responsibility for leisure needs in the social objective by rescaling type-
ij individual utility by a factor wi￿j.8 In other words we keep the disutility of labor as it is, with
the leisure need, but we compensate for this undue handicap by "taxing" the individual with
its market value. In Figure 5 we represent this cardinalization: a type-i1 individual works ￿i1,
earns yi1 and consumes ci1, whereas a type-i2 individual works ￿i1 +￿, earns yi2 = yi1 +wi￿ and
consumes ci1+ wi￿ (i.e. the needy individual earns and consumes wi￿ less than the non-needy
one for an equal amount of eﬀective labor supply). The fact that two individuals with the same
ability and diﬀerent needs achieve diﬀerent allocations along the same budget constraint is not
6When all low-ability individuals belong to a single type (say, needy), those individuals belonging to the other
type (say, non-needy) can be identiﬁed as high-ability ones. If all non-needy individuals are high-ability ones,
there is no SSC in the non-needy group that sets a minimum bound on type 22’s utility. Hence, we must ensure
type-22’s utility does nof fall bellow type-11. This constraint binds and U21 > U22 = U11. If the low-ability type
is non-needy, the needy individuals are identiﬁed as high-ability types and U22 > U21 = U12.
7We study the case in which the planner attempts to make the individuals fully responsible for their needs.
However, an alternative option would be to specify a fraction of the leisure need that an individual is responsible
for. This was suggested to us by a referee and we believe it would be highly appropriate in instances where,
using the same commuting example as above, an individual who has a longer time to commute derives to some
extent joy from living in the countryside, or from contacts made while communting, that partly compensate for
the longer commute.
8Note that the type of rescaling required to make the individuals responsible for their leisure needs depends












Figure 5: Compensation versus responsibility for leisure needs
considered problematic when the needy individual is deemed responsible for the shortfall.9
This is one possible representation of the concept of responsibility. There are other ways
although none is perfect. Fleurbaey (1995) provides a rather broad discussion of the treatment of
responsibility in economic theory and in egalitarian theories of justice. Fleurbaey and Maniquet
(2006, 2007) deal with this issue in a framework more closely related to ours. They characterize
the optimal income tax when individuals diﬀer in ability and preferences for leisure, and consider
fairness principles that capture the notions of compensation and responsibility. In particular,
Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) propose a fairness requirement that is based on the respect of
individual preferences and relates to Dworkin (1981) argument that, when all agents have the
same wage rate and all have access to the same labor-consumption bundles, there is no need
for redistribution as any income diﬀerence is then a matter of personal preferences. We apply a
similar principle to needs rather than to preferences.


















+ µ(wi￿ij − cij)
￿
.
The FOCs yield v￿ ￿
￿ij + ￿j
￿
= wi and G￿
ij = µ ∀ij. The labor supply of each type coincides
with what was obtained before in the ﬁrst-best problem with compensation for leisure needs.
9Note that with compensation for leisure needs the indiﬀerence curves i1 and i2
￿ represented the same utility
level for types i1 and i2, respectively, whereas under responsibility, it is now the indiﬀerence curves i1 and i2 that
capture the same utility level for these two types.





















which implies ci2 − ci1 = wi￿ and, hence, no compensation for leisure needs.
The second-best problem and the associated FOCs are similar in form to those obtained
with compensation. The only diﬀerence is that the argument of G￿ (.) in the FOCs includes
now the rescaling factor wi￿j. It is worth noticing that, although the social planner employs
it in the social objective, the rescaling factor does not appear in the SSCs. All high-ability
individuals face zero marginal tax rates. The eﬀective labor supply is the same for both high-
ability types (i.e. ￿21 + ￿ = ￿22) and coincides with the one obtained in the ﬁrst-best. In any
case the relationship between the utility levels, which now include the rescaling factor w2￿j, is
determined by comparing λ1/n21 and λ2/n22. Both low-ability individuals face positive marginal
tax rates, and the relationship between their utility levels depends on the relationship between
λ1/n11 and λ2/n12.
Boadway and Pestieau (2006) did not consider making individuals responsible for their con-
sumption needs. Nevertheless, it could similarly be argued that, even though it may seem fair
to compensate individuals for certain kinds of consumption needs (for instance, certain expenses
on health care), there may be other kinds of consumption needs that the individuals could be
deemed responsible for. It is worth recalling that, in their framework, consumption needs ap-
pear in the linear term of the quasilinear utility speciﬁcation, and the magnitude of the need is
the same regardless of ability type. It is quite straightforward to show that, in such a setting,
tagging with responsibility for needs would yield the same results as pure tagging (i.e. tagging
when the observable characteristic has no welfare signiﬁcance).
In our case responsibility for leisure needs does not lead to the pure tagging outcome because
a uniform rescaling down of the consumption of both needy individuals does not imply that both
ability types are made responsible for their needs to the same extent. This is best illustrated by













18The needy low-ability individuals are made responsible for their leisure needs when their con-
sumption is shifted down by the amount w1￿. The allocation of high-ability individuals is shifted
down by the same amount due to the SSC that links both needy individuals. This means that
the needy high-ability individuals are not made fully responsible for their leisure needs, which
would require shifting down their consumption by w2￿.
6 Non-observable needs
We have assumed that needs are observable and can be used as a tag. We brieﬂy discuss here
the implications of being unable to observe leisure needs. This exercise is relevant because
it enables us to assess diﬀerences with respect to the analysis carried out above where needs
could be observed and used as a tag. With unobservable ability and leisure needs, we have an
optimal tax problem similar to the one studied by Cremer et al. (2001).10 They show that the
distribution of the two characteristics, and in particular the correlation between them, plays a
crucial role. Their analysis also emphasizes the complexities involved in determining the pattern
of binding self-selection constraints.
In our case, a simple comparison of the marginal rates of substitution of consumption for











points to the impossibility of establishing in general whether the indiﬀerence curves of type-21
individuals are steeper or ﬂatter than those of type-12 ones. This has important implications for
the analysis of binding self-selection constraints in the general four-types society.11 In the three-
types societies, where those two types do not coexist, it is possible to unambiguously determine
10Cremer et al. (2001) studies the optimal tax mix problem when individuals diﬀer in unobservable productivity
and endowments. They consider several consumption goods and a separable, but not necessarily quasi-linear,
utility speciﬁcation.

















yc. Because v (.) is strictly increasing and strictly convex the ordering of marginal
rates of substitution is the exact opposite of the ordering of utility and, due to the concavity of the social welfare
function, to the direction of redistribution. Both cases may be analyzed in the traditional Mirrlees setting and
yield the usual prediction of potitive marginal tax rates for all but type-22 individuals. We are grateful to an
anonymous referee for highlighting this point.
19the direction in which the single-crossing property holds. For the 3-type society {11,12,22},
we obtained a ranking of individual utility levels U22 > U11 > U12 when leisure needs were
observable and used as a tag. When leisure needs are not observable, and can no longer be
used as a tag, type-11 individuals are clearly the worst-oﬀ and we have that U22 > U12 > U11.
The marginal tax rate on type-11 individuals is now positive due to an additional binding self-
selection constraint that precludes type-12 individuals from applying for the treatment designed
for type-11 individuals. For the 3-type society {11,21,22} we obtained U21 > U22 > U11 before
but if the tag is no longer available we have that U22 > U21 > U11.
It is worth emphasizing a key diﬀerence with respect to the consumption needs case studied
by Boadway and Pestieau (2006). Recall that the utility speciﬁcation is the same: quasi-linear
in consumption. If consumption needs, which enter the linear part of the utility function,
were unobservable in their framework, two individuals with the same ability but diﬀerent needs
would become eﬀectively indistinguishable. Their indiﬀerence curves in the (y,c)-space exhibit
the same shape, even if the two types achieve diﬀerent utility levels when allocated the same
(y,c)-bundle, given that the eﬀective consumption of the needy individual is then lower. In our
framework, where the needs enter the non-linear disutility of labor function, the indiﬀerence
curves of two individuals with the same ability and diﬀerent needs exhibit, according to (3),
diﬀerent shapes. This feature can be exploited to separate them in the case of unobservable
leisure needs if it is shown optimal to do so.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have studied the optimal redistributive tax scheme when individuals diﬀer in
two characteristics, earning ability and leisure needs, which were assumed to be imperfectly
correlated. Individuals have private information about their abilities, but needs are observable.
The population can then be separated into two groups and needs can be used as a tag. We ﬁrst
assumed that the social planner considered leisure needs as a characteristic relevant for compen-
sation and characterized the optimal redistributive policy, and the extent of compensation for
leisure needs, with tagging. Even if leisure needs are observable, the amount required to fully
20compensate the individuals for their needs diﬀers across ability types, and depends on their
unobservable ability. This implies imperfect compensation for needs in most cases. We have
also considered situations in which the social planner deemed individuals responsible for their
leisure needs and characterized the optimal solution in this case. We showed, using the maximin
illustration with four types, that attempting to make individuals responsible for their leisure
needs does not correspond to pure tagging, as it would be the case with linear consumption
needs. Even if needy low-ability individuals were made fully responsible for their needs, it is
not possible to make needy high-ability individuals fully responsible. We also brieﬂy discussed
the implications of being unable to observe leisure needs, which is an issue that deserves further
research.
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